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BELK V. COMMISSIONER: LAND 
SUBSTITUTIONS IN CONSERVATION 
EASEMENTS 
Morgan Davis∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code permits landowners to take an 
income tax deduction for donating a “conservation easement.”1 A 
conservation easement restricts land development in favor of one or 
more conservation goals.2 These goals may include the preservation 
of land for public outdoor recreation or education, the protection of a 
natural habitat of wildlife or plants, the preservation of open space 
for scenic enjoyment, or the preservation of a historically important 
area.3 
For example, suppose a landowner owns property abutting a 
river that is the natural habitat for a population of fish. The 
landowner may donate a conservation easement extinguishing her 
right to develop the land in order to protect the natural habitat. This 
donation constitutes a charitable contribution and entitles the 
landowner to take an income tax deduction.4 Conservation easements 
that qualify for an income tax deduction are referred to as “qualified 
conservation contributions” and are deductible under section 170(h) 
of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”).5 
B.V. Belk Jr. and Harriet C. Belk (“Petitioners”) sought to take
advantage of the conservation easement deduction. Petitioners 
∗ J.D., LL.M., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, May 2015; B.A., Philosophy, University
of California, Irvine, May 2011. Thank you to Professor Katherine Pratt for her expert guidance 
and unwavering support as I wrote this Comment. 
1. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2012); Roger Colinvaux, The Conservation Easement Tax
Expenditure: In Search of Conservation Value, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4 (2012). 
2. Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88
VA. L. REV. 739, 741–42 (2002). 
3. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A); Connie Kertz, Conservation Easements at the Crossroads,
34 REAL EST. L.J. 139, 143 (2005). 
4. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(h).
5. Id. § 170. Title 26 of United States Code is referred to as the Internal Revenue Code.
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donated a conservation easement and claimed a deduction of more 
than $10.5 million in 2004.6 The easement protected a golf course 
nestled within a private residential complex.7 Petitioners’ easement 
included a “substitution provision” whereby the parties could agree 
to change what land was subject to the easement’s development 
restrictions.8 In Belk v. Commissioner (Belk I),9 the tax court denied 
Petitioners’ charitable contribution deduction, holding that 
Petitioners’ easement was not a restriction “granted in perpetuity” as 
required by the Code.10  
Since Congress first allowed conservation easement deductions 
in 1976,11 donations of conservation easements have rapidly 
increased.12 Now, an estimated forty million acres in the United 
States are encumbered by conservation easements.13 Furthermore, 
donations of conservation easements typically generate six-figure 
deductions.14 Conservation easement deductions cost taxpayers 
billions of dollars in the form of foregone tax revenue.15 One 
estimate provides that $3.6 billion total revenue was lost between 
2003 and 2008, not including corporate donations of conservation 
easements.16 
The court in Belk I held that any conservation easement 
containing a substitution provision was not eligible for a charitable 
contribution deduction.17 The court’s decision discourages taxpayers 
from including substitution provisions in their conservation 
easements because such easements will not receive favorable tax 
6. Belk v. Comm’r (Belk I), 140 T.C. 1, 6 (2013). Precisely, Petitioners claimed a deduction
in the amount of $10,524,000. Id. 
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 3–4.
9. 140 T.C. 1 (2013).
10. Id. at 10, 15.
11. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2124(e)(1)(C), 90 Stat. 1916, 1919
(1967) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
12. Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma
of Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVT’L. L. REV. 119, 119 (2010). 
13. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Perpetual Conservation Easements in the 21st Century: What
Have We Learned and Where Should We Go From Here?, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 687, 717 (2013). 
14. Id. at 715–16.
15. Id. at 716.
16. Colinvaux, supra note 1, at 9–10 n.26.
17. Belk I, 140 T.C. 1, 10–11 (2013); see Belk v. Comm’r (Belk II), 105 T.C.M. (CCH)
1878, *6–7 (2013). 
2015] LAND SUBSTITUTIONS 1195 
treatment. This outcome is undesirable because substitution 
provisions can help easements achieve their conservation goals.18 
Part II of this Comment presents the facts of Belk I, and Part III 
explains the court’s reasoning. Part IV.B analyzes the court’s 
reasoning in Belk I and explains that Petitioners granted an easement 
in perpetuity. Part IV.C analyzes Belk I’s subsequent history, Belk v. 
Commissioner T.C.M. (Belk II),19 and concludes that the court was 
primarily concerned with how Petitioners valued their easement. Part 
IV.D argues for the desirability of substitution provisions, explaining
that such provisions can help achieve an easement’s conservation
purposes. Part V proposes a rule for handling future substitution
provisions. Finally, Part VI presents the issue of whether easements
protecting golf courses, like Petitioners’ easement, should be
categorically ineligible for the deduction under section 170.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Belk I, Petitioners owned approximately 410 acres of land, 
which they transferred to their limited liability company Olde 
Sycamore, LLC (“Olde Sycamore”).20 Olde Sycamore built a 
residential community on the land, which included a semi-public golf 
course.21 The golf course was not contiguous, but lay in clusters 
throughout the residential development.22 In total, the golf course 
consisted of roughly 185 acres.23 
Olde Sycamore granted a conservation easement to Smokey 
Mountain National Land Trust (SMNLT) that prohibited the 
185-acre golf course from being used for residential, commercial,
institutional, industrial, or agricultural purposes.24 The agreement
stated, and the parties later stipulated, that the golf course possessed
recreational, natural, scenic, open space, and educational values.25
The agreement contained a “substitution provision,” whereby 
Petitioners and SMNLT could mutually agree to change what 
18. See Bray, supra note 12, at 138 (discussing the desirability of “shifting” easements).
19. 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1878 (2013).
20. Belk I, 140 T.C. at 2.
21. Id. at 2–3.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id. Precisely, the golf course covered 184.627 acres, id., but for the sake of simplicity, I
will refer to the specific acres on which the golf course sits as 185 acres. 
24. Id.
25. Id. at 3 n.7.
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property was subject to the conservation easement and its 
accompanying restrictions.26 The substitution provision, which 
allowed Petitioners to substitute an area of contiguous land for land 
currently restricted by the easement, provided in relevant part that (1) 
the substituted land was of equal or greater area than the land to be 
taken out; (2) the substitution would not adversely affect the 
conservation purpose of the easement or any other significant 
environmental features of the easement; and (3) the fair market value 
of SMNLT’s conservation easement would not decline as a result of 
the substitution.27 The substitution provision further provided that if 
SMNLT did not consent to a proposed substitution, SMNLT would 
help Petitioners identify land that would meet all of the substitution 
provision’s requirements “but also accomplish [Petitioners’] 
objectives.”28  
Petitioners claimed a charitable contribution deduction of 
$10,524,000 for donating the conservation easement.29 They 
calculated the amount of the deduction by taking the difference 
between the fair market value of the 185 acres unrestricted and the 
fair market value of the 185 acres restricted by the easement.30 The 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed Petitioners’ 
deduction, and they contested the Commissioner’s finding in court.31 
The tax court held that Petitioners were not entitled to a charitable 
contribution deduction because their “floating easement”32 was not a 
“qualified conservation contribution.”33 
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The tax court began by explaining that section 170 of the Code 
governs charitable contribution deductions.34 Section 170(f) prohibits 
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 3–4. The substitution provision additionally provided that in the opinion of
SMNLT, (1) the substituted land was of the same or better ecological stability as the land to be 
taken out; (2) the substitution would have no adverse impact on the environmental features of the 
conservation area, nor adversely impact it in any way; and (3) petitioners had to submit sufficient 
documentation to SMNLT showing how the substitution met the required criteria. Id. 
28. Id.
29. Id. at 5–6.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id. at 10.
33. Id. at 10–11, 15.
34. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2012); Belk I, 140 T.C. at 6.
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charitable contribution deductions for transfers of partial interests in 
property, such as an easement, but provides an exception for 
“qualified conservation contributions.”35 A qualified conservation 
contribution is a (1) qualified real property interest; (2) transferred to 
a qualified organization; (3) exclusively for conservation purposes.36 
A qualified real property interest includes “a restriction (granted in 
perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real property.”37 
Additionally, for a contribution to be made “exclusively for 
conservation purposes,” the conservation purpose must be protected 
in perpetuity.38 
The court held that Petitioners’ donated easement was not a 
restriction granted in perpetuity, and thus, Petitioners did not make a 
qualified conservation contribution entitling them to a deduction.39 
The court found that Petitioners donated an interest in their golf 
course.40 The restriction on the golf course was not granted in 
perpetuity, however, because Petitioners could change what land was 
subject to the easement.41 In essence, the court found that Petitioners 
had agreed not to develop the golf course, but simultaneously had 
retained the right to develop the golf course through the substitution 
provision.42 Thus, Petitioners did not donate an interest in real 
property that was subject to a restriction in perpetuity.43 
The court rejected Petitioners’ argument that because the 
conservation purpose was protected in perpetuity, the restriction was 
granted in perpetuity also.44 The court distinguished between the 
requirements that (1) the use restriction be granted in perpetuity, and 
(2) the conservation purpose be protected in perpetuity.45 The court
held that the restriction was not granted in perpetuity.46
Consequently, the court did not address whether the conservation
35. Belk I, 140 T.C. at 6–7 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(f), (h)).
36. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1); Belk I, 140 T.C. at 7.
37. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(C); Belk I, 140 T.C. at 9.
38. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(5)(A).
39. Belk I, 140 T.C. at 15.
40. Id. at 10.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 10–11.
43. Id. at 11.
44. Id. at 12.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 10.
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purpose was protected in perpetuity.47 Petitioners filed a motion for 
reconsideration, but the motion was denied in Belk II.48 
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Historical Significance
The distinction the court in Belk I made between the 
requirement that the restriction be granted in perpetuity (the 
“restriction-in-perpetuity requirement”) and the requirement that 
the conservation purpose be protected in perpetuity (the 
“conservation-purpose-perpetuity requirement”) marks a departure 
from previous interpretations of section 170(h).49 In Belk I, the 
Commissioner combined discussion of both requirements.50 In 
previous decisions the court itself combined its discussion of both 
requirements, suggesting that they were equivalent.51 
Additionally, the U.S. Department of Treasury has merged the 
two requirements.52 The U.S. Department of Treasury publishes 
federal income tax regulations, which represent the “official” (i.e., 
executive) interpretations of the Code.53 The Treasury Regulation 
interpreting section 170(h), Reg. § 1.170A-14, discusses “the 
perpetuity requirement” in subsection (g) without mentioning 
whether it refers to the restriction or the conservation purpose.54 In 
fact, subsection (g) mentions both the restriction-in-perpetuity and 
the conservation-purpose-perpetuity requirements. Subsection (g)(1) 
discusses the perpetuity requirement “in general” and mentions the 
47. Id. at 15.
48. Belk II, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1878 (2013).
49. Belk I, 140 T.C. at 11–12 (citing Simmons v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 211 (2009);
Turner v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 299, 311 (2006); Glass v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 258, 276–77 (2005)). 
50. Belk I, 140 T.C. at 11.
51. Id. at 11–12 (citing Simmons, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 211; Turner, 126 T.C. at 311; Glass,
124 T.C. at 276–77).  
52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g) (as amended in 2009).
53. See Tax Code, Regulations and Official Guidance, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Tax
-Professionals/Tax-Code,-Regulations-and-Official-Guidance (last updated Feb. 24, 2014).
Section 7805 of the Code gives the IRS the authority to interpret its provisions. 26 U.S.C. § 7805
(2012). Courts give deference to the regulations, but they are not law. See generally Ellen P.
Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 51 (1996)
(discussing the appropriate degree of deference courts should give to the regulations).
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g).
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conservation-purpose-perpetuity requirement.55 However, subsection 
(g)(3) discusses the restriction-in-perpetuity requirement.56 In 
holding that the restriction-in-perpetuity requirement and the 
conservation-purpose-perpetuity requirement are distinct, the court 
explained that Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g) pertains only to 
the conservation-purpose-perpetuity requirement.57 Yet even after 
Belk I, tax courts have continued to use the regulation in their 
analysis of the restriction-in-perpetuity-requirement.58 If the court’s 
distinction continues to hold, the regulations should be amended to 
clearly set out which rules apply to which requirement. 
Belk I renders all conservation easements that allow for 
substitutions ineligible for a deduction because they are not 
restrictions granted in perpetuity and, therefore, are not a “qualified 
real property interest.”59 The discussion that follows analyzes the 
soundness of the court’s arguments in Belk I and Belk II and the 
desirability of their holdings. 
B. Belk I
The court in Belk I did not address whether Petitioners 
transferred a property interest “exclusively for conservation 
purposes.”60 For the sake of argument, this Comment assumes that 
Petitioners did, and that the “conservation purpose” was to preserve 
55. See id. § 1.170A-14(g)(1) (“[A]ny interest in the property retained by the donor . . . must
be subject to legally enforceable restrictions . . . that will prevent uses of the retained interest 
inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the donation.”). 
56. See id. (explaining that an easement does not fail to be a qualified conservation
contribution merely because the donee’s interest would fail on the happening of some remote 
event); see also Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 392–93 (2013) (using Treasury Regulation 
subsection (g)(3) to explain the restriction-in-perpetuity requirement (26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(C))). 
57. Belk I, 140 T.C. 1, 12 n.19 (2013) (explaining that Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-
14(g) relates to code section 170(h)(5), which is the conservation-purpose-perpetuity 
requirement). 
58. See, e.g., Graev, 140 T.C. at 393 (decided after Belk I and discussing Treasury
Regulation section 1.170A-14(g)(3) while analyzing the restriction-in-perpetuity requirement (26 
U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(C))); Gorra v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523, *20 (2013) (also decided 
after Belk I and clarifying the restriction-in-perpetuity requirement with reference to Treasury 
Regulation section 1.170A-14(g)(1)).  
59. Belk II, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1878, *2, *6–7 (2013).
60. See Belk I, 140 T.C. at 15 (concluding that Petitioners have not satisfied section
170(h)(2)(C), relating to a qualified real property interest, and therefore Petitioners are not 
entitled to a deduction). 
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the “recreational, open-space and scenic value” of the golf course, as 
stipulated by the parties.61 
Petitioners arguably transferred a restriction on real property in 
perpetuity. Neither party could extinguish the restriction.62 The 
parties could merely agree to change which specific acreage was 
subject to the easement’s restrictions.63 
The court in Belk I began with the assumption that Petitioners 
transferred an interest in “the golf course.”64 In fact, Petitioners 
transferred a more abstract property interest. They transferred an 
interest in 410 acres of land, whereby at least 185 acres could not be 
used for residential, commercial, institutional, industrial, or 
agricultural purposes, and further satisfied the requirements of the 
substitution provision.65 Petitioners did not promise to refrain from 
developing the golf course, as the court claimed.66 Rather, Petitioners 
promised to maintain at least 185 acres of land undeveloped, and 
promised to preserve recreational, open-space, and scenic value at 
least to the extent the golf course possessed these values.67 This 
promise is not illusory: it limits how much Petitioners can develop 
their land in favor of the conservation value of the golf course. 
Construed in this way, the restriction exists in perpetuity. At any 
given moment, the restriction is in effect, but what specific acreage is 
giving it effect is subject to change. Thus, the court in Belk I should 
have held that Petitioners granted a restriction in perpetuity. 
C. Belk II
On Petitioners’ request for reconsideration, the court in Belk II 
maintained that a qualified real property interest must be a specific 
and identifiable piece of real property.68 The court went on to explain 
its reasons for denying the deduction and, in so doing, revealed that 
its discomfort with Petitioners’ easement was not with the 
61. Id. at 3 n.7.
62. See id. at 3–4.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 10.
65. Id. at 2–3. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue characterized Petitioners’ easement as
a “floating easement,” which is a helpful label for easements that allow for substitutions. Id. at 10. 
66. Id. at 10–11.
67. See id. at 3–5.
68. Belk II, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1878, *7–8 (2013).
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restriction’s lack of perpetuity but with how Petitioners valued their 
easement. The Court thus explained: 
When a taxpayer donates a partial interest, he retains the 
remaining interest in the property. Thus, the taxpayer is 
effectively splitting the property into two pieces: (1) the 
retained portion and (2) the donated portion. Petitioners’ 
interpretation of the statute would allow the donated portion 
(i.e., the easement) to encumber any piece of property; it 
could be the retained portion or another piece of property 
that the taxpayer owns . . . If the donated portion does not 
restrict the use of the retained portion, then the taxpayer has 
retained 100% of the economic value of the property for 
which he or she is taking a deduction. The fact that the 
donated property might encumber and thus reduce the value 
of some unrelated property is irrelevant.69 
Here, the court still assumed that Petitioners had retained an 
interest in “the golf course.”70 In fact, Petitioners had retained an 
interest in the full 410 acres of land. The “donated portion” of the 
410 acres was the requirement that at least 185 acres of the 410 
remain undeveloped and possess the current golf course’s 
conservation value. Petitioners did not retain 100 percent of the 
economic value of the 410 acres because they could not develop all 
410 acres: at least 185 acres had to remain undeveloped and 
effectuate the conservation purposes of the easement. 
Yet, Petitioners calculated their deduction as the difference in 
value between the golf course unrestricted and the golf course 
subject to the easement’s restrictions.71 In other words, Petitioners’ 
value of the easement assumed that the easement would always 
restrict the golf course.72 Petitioners’ valuation does not include the 
fact that they can restrict other portions of the 410 acres in place of 
the golf course.73 As the court in Belk II explained above, Petitioners 
cannot take a deduction based on the value of the golf course and, at 
the same time, develop the golf course by restricting other land.74 
69. Id. at *8 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at *2–3.
71. Belk I, 140 T.C. at 5.
72. See id. at 10 n.15.
73. Id.
74. See Belk II, 105 T.C.M (CCH) 1878, *7–8 (2013).
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The land that could be substituted must be factored into the 
easement’s value. 
The Treasury Regulations provide that the amount of a 
charitable deduction for a conservation easement is the fair market 
value of the easement.75 Often, taxpayers are permitted to calculate 
the value of their easements by taking the difference between the fair 
market value of the property involved before and after the grant of 
the easement.76 When an easement burdens only a portion of a 
landowner’s contiguous property, the fair market value of the 
easement is the value of all of the landowner’s contiguous property 
before and after granting the easement.77 Thus, Petitioners should 
have valued their easement based on the difference between the fair 
market value of their 410 acres pre- and post-easement. Specifically, 
they should have taken the difference between the value of the 410 
acres unencumbered, and the value of the 410 acres where 185 of the 
acres must be used as a golf course, or otherwise possess the current 
golf course’s conservation values. 
Valuation is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry,78 and possibly, 
Petitioners could have ascertained additional factors relevant to the 
easement’s value. However, merely taking the golf course’s value 
before the easement and subtracting the value of the golf course 
subject to the easement’s restrictions was not an accurate estimate of 
the easement’s value.79 Therefore, the court in Belk I or Belk II could 
have denied Petitioners’ deduction on valuation grounds. 
D. An Outright Ban on Substitution
Provisions Is Undesirable
As mentioned above, Belk I and Belk II render easements with 
substitution provisions ineligible for the federal income tax 
deduction in all cases.80 But substitution provisions are desirable 
because they create flexibility in conservation easement 
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i) (as amended in 2009).
76. Id.; Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
77. Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. v. Comm’r, 615 F.3d 321, 338 (5th Cir. 2010); Browning v.
Comm’r, 109 T.C. 303, 316 (1997); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i). Additionally, if an 
easement increases the value of any of the landowner’s other property, whether or not contiguous, 
this increase proportionately decreases the easement’s value. Kertz, supra note 3, at 145. 
78. See, e.g., Stanley Works and Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 389, 408 (1986).
79. See Kertz, supra note 3, at 145.
80. Belk II, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1878, *7–8 (2013).
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restrictions.81 Experts in conservation easements have recently 
argued for increased flexibility in easement restrictions.82 Because 
“[o]ur sense of what is ecologically and scenically valuable . . . 
evolve[s] over time,”83 inflexible restrictions in conservation 
easements may obstruct future conservation efforts.84 Some scholars 
are already exploring the desirability of so-called “shifting” 
conservation easements.85 These easements would protect against 
species loss by tracking “migrating species . . . across different land 
parcels.”86 In order for conservation easements to track migrating 
species, or account for habitats shifting due to climate change, they 
need something akin to a substitution provision contained in their 
terms.87 
As another example, consider the following hypothetical: 
suppose a certain taxpayer owns five hundred acres of land. She 
intends to develop the land but has discovered that a population of 
endangered species lives somewhere on the premises. So the 
taxpayer agrees to set aside two hundred acres for habitat 
preservation. If the precise location of the species is unknown, the 
taxpayer should be allowed to donate a conservation easement 
containing a substitution provision so that the parties can later 
substitute the land that best protects the habitat. Or, suppose after the 
taxpayer granted the easement, the easement holder determined that a 
different two hundred acres would better preserve the habitat. In such 
a case, the parties should be free to substitute the land that better 
serves the easement’s conservation purposes, pursuant to a 
substitution provision, and the taxpayer should be entitled to the tax 
deduction. 
81. See Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of
Perpetual Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 122 (2011). 
82. See, e.g., Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation
Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public Land Use Process 
(Case Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 07-24, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1004363. 
83. Id. at 31.
84. Bray, supra note 12, at 138; see Duncan M. Greene, Dynamic Conservation Easements:
Facing the Problem of Perpetuity in Land Conservation, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 883, 885 (2005) 
(“[D]ynamic conservation easements capable of accommodating change over time . . . are more 
likely to fulfill their promise to protect the land in perpetuity.”). 
85. Bray, supra note 12, at 138.
86. Id.
87. See id.
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Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-1488 provides that an easement 
may be terminated if “changed conditions . . . make impossible or 
impractical the continued use of the property for conservation 
purposes.”89 In such a case, the easement holder must use its share of 
the proceeds from a subsequent sale of the property consistently with 
the easement’s conservation purposes.90 However, this limited 
“substitution provision”91 only accounts for situations where 
fulfilling the conservation purpose is impossible or impractical.92 It 
does not account for situations where substituting another parcel of 
land would simply better serve the easement’s conservation 
purposes. 
V. PROPOSAL
The facts in Belk I can be distinguished from the example given 
above. In the example above, the parties’ reason for substituting 
land, and thus the purpose of including a substitution provision in the 
easement, is to better serve the easement’s conservation purpose. In 
Belk I, the Petitioners included the substitution provision for their 
own private benefit.93 Hypothetically, Petitioners could substitute 
land to increase their income from the surrounding residential units. 
The substitution provision allowed Petitioners to substitute land for 
any reason, provided that the conservation purpose was protected 
along with other requirements.94 If SMNLT did not consent to a 
proposed substitution, SMNLT had to help Petitioners identify land 
that would meet the substitution provision requirements “but also 
accomplish [Petitioners’] objectives.”95 Therefore, the purpose of the 
substitution provision was to benefit Petitioners personally, and not 
to enhance the conservation value of the easement. After all, the golf 
course could be built and maintained on any of the 410 acres, so 
shifting the golf course to another location would not likely have 
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14 (as amended in 2009).
89. Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i).
90. Id.
91. See Belk II, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1878, *9–10 (2013) (explaining that Treasury Regulation
section 1.170A-14 allows for “substitutions” where complying with easement’s restrictions 
becomes impossible or impractical). 
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(2).
93. See Belk I, 140 T.C. 1, 3–4 (2013).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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made the golf course any better, bigger, more beautiful, or more open 
to public. Rather, a substitution would have resulted in Petitioners’ 
private benefit by increasing the value of their residential 
development. 
Where a charitable contribution under section 170 results in a 
private benefit to the donor, the amount of the charitable deduction 
must be reduced by the amount of the benefit.96 That is, a 
contribution is not “charitable” to the extent that it benefits the 
donor.97 If, due to a substitution Petitioners’ 410 acres increased in 
value, Petitioners would have to subtract this increase from the 
amount of their charitable deduction.98 But in this case, Petitioners 
would have already taken the deduction, and the statute of limitations 
could run before a substitution ultimately took place, preventing the 
IRS from contesting the deduction.99 The purpose of Petitioners’ 
substitution provision, and the likely effect of an actual substitution, 
would be to privately benefit Petitioners, without a corresponding 
public benefit or decrease in Petitioners’ deduction. Thus, Petitioners 
should not be entitled to a charitable contribution deduction for their 
easement. 
A conservation easement with a substitution provision should be 
deductible when the purpose of the provision is to further the 
easement’s conservation purposes. Where the purpose of the 
substitution provision is to benefit the private landowner, the 
conservation easement should be ineligible for the deduction. This 
proposed rule satisfactorily addresses both the facts in Belk I and the 
hypothetical given in Part IV.D. As explained above, substitution 
provisions can be useful tools in drafting conservation easements to 
effectively serve their conservation purposes. But an easement 
containing a substitution provision designed to benefit the landowner 
is not a “charitable” contribution as required by section 170, because 
the donor can privately benefit from a substitution without increasing 
96. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
97. See United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 118 (1986); Scheidelman v.
Comm’r, 682 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2012); Winters v. Comm’r, 468 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir. 
1972). 
98. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i) (as amended in 2009) (“[I]f the donor . . . receives,
or can reasonably expect to receive, a financial or economic benefit that is substantial, but it is 
clearly shown that the benefit is less than the amount of the transfer, then a deduction under this 
section is allowable for the excess of the amount transferred over the amount of the financial or 
economic benefit received or reasonably expected to be received by the donor . . . .”). 
99. See 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a) (2012).
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the public value of the contribution.100 One of the leading scholars in 
conservation easements has expressed the need for “[r]easonable 
rules regarding the amendment of perpetual conservation 
easements—rules that ensure sufficient flexibility to . . . adapt to 
changing circumstances.”101 Permitting substitutions only when they 
further the conservation purposes of the easement and not when they 
bestow private benefit should be one of these rules. 
VI. DOES A GOLF COURSE HAVE A
“CONSERVATION” PURPOSE?
Another issue lurking within Belk I, and perhaps indirectly 
influencing the court’s decision, is whether a golf course possesses a 
sufficient conservation purpose. Many golf courses “literally comply 
with [section] 170(h),”102 since they provide outdoor recreation for 
the public.103 However, many conservation groups and legislators 
have argued that golf courses should not be within the “conservation 
purposes” allowed by the Code.104 
For instance, in the wake of alleged abuses of section 170(h), the 
Joint Committee on Finance held a hearing in 2005 suggesting 
proposals to reform section 170(h).105 Many of the speakers 
suggested that easements covering golf courses should not be eligible 
for the deduction because golf courses are not natural and do not 
yield a significant public benefit.106 
In March 2014, the Obama administration proposed eliminating 
the deduction for golf courses.107 The administration argued that the 
private benefit gained from easements on golf courses often 
outweighs the public benefit.108 Further, construction of golf courses 
can actually lead to environmental degradation. As the facts in Belk I 
100. See Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 118.
101. McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 720.
102. Kertz, supra note 3, at 150.
103. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(i).
104. Kertz, supra note 3, at 150.
105. The Tax Code and Land Conservation: Report on Investigations and Proposals for
Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 4 (2005). 
106. See, e.g., id. at 3, 6–7 (statement of Rand Wentworth, President, Land Trust Alliance);
id. at 9 (statement of Steven T. Miller, Internal Revenue Serv. Comm’r, Tax-Exempt Entities). 
107. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL
YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 195 (2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource 
-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2015.pdf.
108. See id.
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illustrate, section 170(h) is not “narrowly tailored to promote only 
bona fide conservation activities.”109 An easement covering a golf 
course surrounded by a residential development is hardly a 
“conservation activity.”110 And the easement is probably going to 
benefit the developer more often than the public.111 
Belk I was not the best test case for substitution provisions. The 
easement covered a golf course, the golf course was surrounded by 
development, and Petitioners took a deduction of more than ten 
million dollars.112 These facts likely influenced the court’s decision 
to deny the deduction outright as opposed to denying it on valuation 
grounds. The court overstated the “restriction-in-perpetuity 
requirement,” in an attempt to deny a deduction for a conservation 
easement possessing little public benefit and considerable private 
benefit. Nevertheless, the court’s flat ban on substitution provisions 
is not desirable. If Congress agrees that easements on golf courses do 
not provide a sufficient public benefit, Congress should amend 
section 170(h).113 
VII. CONCLUSION
Petitioners’ easement should not have failed for lack of 
perpetuity. The easement’s restrictions were perpetual to the extent 
that they were always in effect and could not be terminated by the 
parties.114 However, Petitioners did not accurately value their 
easement. Petitioners should have considered the value of the 410 
acres before and after granting the easement. 
In some situations, easements with substitution provisions 
should be eligible for the deduction under section 170(h). 
Specifically, when the purpose of the substitution provision is to 
further the easement’s conservation purpose, the easement should be 
eligible for the deduction. When the purpose of the substitution 
provision is to bestow private benefit on the landowner, the provision 
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Belk I, 140 T.C. 1, 2–3, 5 (2013).
113. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 713–14 (arguing that litigation is not the best way to
establish clear rules consistent with congressional intent and that section 170(h) or the regulations 
should be revised). 
114. See Belk I, 140 T.C. at 3–4.
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should render the easement ineligible as not constituting a 
“charitable” contribution under section 170. 
Golf courses arguably do not possess bona fide conservation 
value. Easements preserving golf courses, especially those 
surrounded by residential development, probably result in a larger 
private benefit than public benefit. Despite the particular facts in 
Belk I, substitution provisions should be encouraged when they 
further the easement’s conservation purposes. Thus, a substitution 
provision should not in itself render an easement ineligible for a 
deduction under section 170.  
